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EQUALITY, "ANISONOMY," AND JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF MADNESS AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAWt 
Andrew von Hirsch* 
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW. By Norval Morris. Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. ix, 235. 
Cloth, $20; paper, $8.95. 
Norval Morris's latest book, Madness and the Criminal Law, is 
not exclusively addressed to that topic; much of its subject matter is 
sentencing theory. Morris defends, and elaborates upon, the concep-
tion of criminal sentencing that he first espoused in his influential 
book of a decade ago, The Future of Imprisonment. 1 He then at-
tempts to apply that theory not to the mad defendant but to the half-
mad: to the defendant who is not crazy enough to satisfy the legal 
test for exculpation on grounds of insanity, but who nonetheless has 
committed his crime in part because of mental or emotional distur-
bance (pp. 129-7 6). He also deals with exculpation itself- with the 
insanity defense (pp. 29-87) - but there his views seem to me less 
forcefully defended than they are in the remainder of this thoughtful 
volume. In the course of discussing these various topics, Morris also 
tries his hand at fiction. Two of the chapters2 are reports of imagi-
nary incidents of violence involving bizarre mental states, which 
purport to have been written by the late Eric Blair (George Orwell) 
while he was a police officer and magistra~e in Burma in the late 
twenties. These alone make superb reading. 
Morris's book is an argumentative book in the best sense: he re-
ally argues his positions, giving reasons in their support and address-
ing seriously the criticisms that they have received. There is none of 
what one sees all too often in penological debate: the attempt to 
defend a view by merely reasserting it and by caricaturing the objec-
tions raised by others. It is because the book has the virtue of being 
t This review originated in an invitation in March 1983 by Michael H. Tonry to address a 
group of his students at the University of Maryland Law School on the subject of"treating like , 
cases alike" in criminal law, and the ideas herein grew out of that stimulating exchange. I am 
also indebted to Professor Tonry's own helpful comments, and those of Professor Nils 
Jareborg of Uppsala University, Sweden. 
• Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. A.B., 
LL.B, Harvard. Professor von Hirsch is the author of DOING JUSTICE (1976) and (with Kath-
leen Hanrahan) THE QUESTION OF PAROLE (1979). - Ed. 
1. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). 
2. "The Brothel Boy," pp. 7-27, and ''The Planter's Dream," pp. 89-126. 
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good argument that I shall succumb to the temptation of arguing 
back: my disagreement herein with some of Morris's contentions is 
my own attempt to carry the debate a step further. Let me begin, 
then, with Morris's central thesis concerning the rationale of crimi-
nal sentencing and then proceed to his thoughts on half-madness 
and (more briefly) on madness. 
I 
The debate over sentencing theory in the last decade has focused 
in large part on the respective roles that should be given to utilitarian 
considerations and to desert in deciding quanta of punishments. The 
positions have varied from those giving crime-preventive concerns 
exclusive emphasis, 3 to those giving preeminence to notions of pro-
portionality and desert.4 The debate is by no means a purely abstract 
one: on it turns the choice of factors that a rulemaking body such as 
a sentencing commission should use in fashioning its rules or guide-
lines on the choice of sentence. 5 On a desert-oriented rationale, the 
sentence must be based upon the seriousness of the defendant's crim-
inal conduct. The more one moves away from desert and toward 
utilitarian models, the greater the entitlement to use factors that are 
unrelated to the blameworthiness of the conduct and that concern 
instead the likelihood of the defendant's recidivating or the effect of 
the penalty in deterring others. 
In this debate, Professor Morris has been the primary exponent 
of what he calls "limiting retributivism" (p. 161)-namely, a mixed 
model somewhere between pure utilitarianism and the more thor-
oughgoing desert outlook which some of my colleagues and I have 
been advocating.6 In Madness and the Criminal Law, he attempts to 
defend his view against the criticisms of those who advocate more 
reliance on desert. 
Before exploring the differences between Morris and the desert 
advocates, it is important to take note of important similarities. 
Morris, like the modern retributivists, insists that desert is to be 
taken seriously as a constraint on utilitarian pursuits. Throughout 
his book, there is a clearly visible thread of argument that desert is a 
separate, retrospectively-oriented conception based on the blame-
3. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-73 (1977), reprinted in SEN· 
TENCING 205-12 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981). 
4. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); J, 
Kl.EINING, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973), 
5. For a discussion of how one rulemaking agency, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission, dealt with this choice of sentencing rationales, see von Hirsch, Constructing 
Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidellnes Com-
mission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164 (1982). 
6. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING 
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979). 
February 1984] Equality, "Anisonomy," and Justice 1095 
worthiness of the offender's conduct; that desert and prospectively-
oriented utilitarian notions have to be kept distinct and are in poten-
tial conflict; and that the problem of sentencing theory is not to try to 
obliterate that crucial distinction but to find the just and proper bal-
ance of emphasis between retributive and utilitarian notions (pp. 
179-209).7 I could not agree with all this more strongly. 
Let us tum, then, to the areas where Morris and the modem de-
sert advocates disagree. I shall spend more space on these issues be-
cause they are the ones on which Morris concentrates his own 
arguments in this book. 
Morris's basic position in sentencing is that desert supplies the 
upper and lower bounds within which a penalty may justly be levied; 
but that within those bounds, utilitarian concerns - e.g. , the amount 
of punishment needed to achieve a socially acceptable level of deter-
rence - should be decisive. 8 He is attempting to defend this view 
here against those, such as myself, who have been urging that desert 
be given a more central role in deciding punishments.9 Morris in-
sists that we are mistaken: desert, he says, should properly serve 
only as a limiting principle that sets bounds on permissible punish-
ments. It should not.be used as a determining (he uses the less apt 
word "defining") principle - one purporting to guide decisions on 
actual quanta of punishments. In Morris's words: 
Desert is not a defining principle; it is a limiting principle. The concept 
of ''just desert" sets the maximum and minimum of the sentence that 
may be imposed for any offense and helps to define the punishment 
relationships between offenses; it does not give any more fine-tuning to 
the appropriate sentence than that. The fine-tuning is to be done on 
utilitarian principles. [P. 199]. 
The reason desert can only be limiting, Morris goes on to argue, is 
that none of us has any idea of precisely how much punishment is 
deserved for any given category of offense; we can grasp only what 
would be manifestly disproportionate in lenience or severity. As 
Morris puts it: 
When we say a punishment is deserved, we rarely mean that it is pre-
cisely appropriate in the sense that a deterrent punishment could in 
principle be. Rather we mean that it is not undeserved; that it is 
neither too lenient nor too severe; that it neither sentimentally under-
states the wickedness or harmfulness of the crime nor inflicts excessive 
7. Morris thus implicitly rejects the views of those, such as Ernest van den Haag, who 
assert that the idea of proportionate punishments can be explained purely in terms of a deter-
rence calculus or other crime-prevention notions. See van den Haag, Punishment as a Device 
for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 706 (1981). Contra, Goldman, Beyond 
Deterrence Theory: Comments on van den Haag's "Punishment as a Device for Controlling the 
Crime Rate," 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 721 (1981). 
8. This position is set forth in chapter 5 of the book, where Morris presents his general 
sentencing theory, pp. 179-209. 
9. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4. 
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pain or deprivation on the criminal in relation to the wickedness or 
harmfulness of his crime. It is not part of a utilitarian calculus. . . . 
The concept of desert defines relationships between crimes and punish-
ments on a continuum between the unduly lenient and the excessively 
punitive within which the just sentence may be determined on other 
grounds. [P. 198). 
Since desert is only a limiting principle, Morris goes on to assert, the 
sentencer is not obligated to impose equal sentences on equally de-
serving ( or rather, undeserving) criminals: cases that are like in re-
spect to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct may be 
treated unlike where necessary for utilitarian ends (pp. 187-96). In 
fact, Morris entitles his main chapter on sentencing theory as 
"Anisonomy, or Treating Like Cases Unlike." 
When one asks whether desert is limiting or determining, how-
ever, it is essential to specify: determining or limiting for what pur-
pose? One must distinguish betwen ordinal and cardinal magnitudes 
of punishment: That is, between (1) the question of how defendants 
should be punished relative to each other, and (2) the question of 
what absolute severity levels should be chosen to anchor the penalty 
scale.10 To view desert as a determinative principle in deciding how 
crimes should be punished relative to each other does not commit 
one to the claim that it is determinative for deciding their cardinal 
magnitude. 
For modem desert theory, this distinction is critical. Advocates of 
desert-oriented sentencing such as myself do not assert that desert is 
determinative for all purposes. Rather, our claim is a more restricted 
one, to wit: desert is a determinative principle in deciding ordinal 
magnitudes, but only a limiting principle in deciding cardinal mag-
nitudes.11 To see what this means in practice, consider the crime or' 
burglary. The issues of ordinal magnitude deal with how a particu-
lar burglary should be penalized compared to other burglaries and to 
other more or less serious crimes. When desert theorists assert that 
desert is a determining principle here, they mean that the ordering of 
penalties must meet the following two requirements. The first is the 
requirement of parity: criminal conduct of equal seriousness should 
be punished equally, with deviations from such equality permitted 
only where special circumstances alter the harm or culpability -
that is, the degree of blameworthiness - of the defendant's con-
duct.12 The other is that of rank ordering: penalties should be 
ranked and spaced to reflect the ranking and spacing in degree of 
I 0. I introduced this distinction in A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 90-94. It is elaborated 
upon in a recent article of mine, von Hirsch, Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluat-
ing Formal Sentencing Structures and 'I7zeir Rationale, 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209 
(1983). 
11. Id. at 212-14, 219-26. 
12. Id. at 212-13, 226-27. 
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seriousness among crimes.13 What desert theorists object to is decid-
ing these questions of comparative punishments on grounds other 
than the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct: for example, 
to punish a particular burglar more severely than other burglars not 
because his particular crime is any worse but because he is a worse 
risk or because giving him a higher-than-usual punishment would 
make him an example to others.14 
To espouse this view does not, however, require one to hold that 
desert is determinative in deciding cardinal magnitudes. Here, 
rather, most modem desert theorists - certainly I - would admit 
that desert is a limiting principle only. 15 I do not claim to know 
precisely how much punishment an intermediate-level crime such as 
burglary deserves, only that punishments beyond a certain level of 
harshness or leniency are undeserved 16 But to make that concession 
about cardinal magnitude does not in logic compel one to abandon 
desert as the principle for deciding relative severities. 
This distinction between ordinal and cardinal magnitudes may 
seem elementary, but Morris sometimes ignores it in his book. He 
seems to hold that desert must either be limiting for all purposes or 
determinative for all purposes. He quotes for example, a passage of 
mine17 where I am speaking of how a sentencing commission in writ-
ing its guidelines might draw the dividing line on a sentencing grid 
between crimes serious enough to warrant imprisonment and those 
warranting lesser sanctions (p. 204). I state that cardinal proportion-
ality requires severe punishment such as imprisonment for the most 
serious crimes and lesser punishments for the least serious; but that 
the notion of a reasonable proportion between crimes and punish-
ments may not be precise enough to determine exactly where to 
draw the dividing-line through intermediate-level crimes; and hence 
that the rulemaker might properly invoke various nondesert consid-
erations in deciding this latter issue.18 Morris seizes upon this state-
ment of mine as suggesting some kind of inconsistency with a desert 
orientation. In his words: 
Professor von Hirsch would thus allow utilitarian considerations 
within desert constraints to guide a sentencing commission but would 
deny them to a judge. I don't see why, except to protect the elegance of 
his thesis or the robe of the judge. [Pp. 204-205]. 
In fact, my point has nothing to do with theoretical or sartorial 
13. Id. at 213-14, 221-30. 
14. Id. at 237-44. 
15. Id. at 219-26, 230-32. 
16. Id. 
17. von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated.· The American Bar Association's Second 
Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772, 788 (1981). 
18. Id. at 787-789. 
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elegance. It has to do with the difference between ordinality and 
cardinality. A sentencing commission, within broad limits of cardi-
nal proportionality, might anchor the penalty scale by deciding to 
locate the "in-out" (f.e., prison vs. non-prison) dividing line a little 
higher or lower on the sentencing grid, so that intermediate-level 
crimes such as burglary either receive a short period of imprison-
ment or a jail or probation sentence instead. 19 But once the scale has 
been so anchored, the rulemak.er is required to observe parity among 
convicted burglars - and to rank higher or lower on the penalty 
scale crimes which are, respectively, more or less serious than bur-
glaries. 20 The fact that I may have no precise quantum in mind as 
the precise deserved penalty for burglary does not mean I am pre-
cluded from insisting that the punishment for burglaries should be 
ranked vis-a-vis the punishment for other crimes so as to reflect the 
relative gravity of those acts.21 
If one does bear in mind the distinction between cardinal and 
ordinal magnitudes, what is Morris's thesis? Morris is saying that 
desert is a significant limiting principle in deciding cardinal magni-
tudes. A penalty system, he is saying, ought not be so inflated or 
deflated that penalties cease to bear any reasonable relationship to 
the degree of reprehensibleness of crimes. Here, Morris's view does 
not seem so different from that of desert theorists. The difference 
comes when one deals with ordinal magnitudes. There, Morris is 
saying that one need not observe parity in punishment among 
equally serious criminal acts, if there are utilitarian reasons for im-
posing different punishments. And he seems also to take the rank-
ordering principle less seriously than desert theorists would: one 
may, for deterrent or incapacitative purposes, punish a few burglars 
more severely than most convicted robbers - so long as one is not 
being so very harsh as to breach the cardinal limits on the punish-
ment of burglary. 
II 
Professor Morris's thesis, in my view, faces two main difficulties. 
One, internal to his own statement of his thesis, concerns the width 
of the desert limits. The other problem concerns the condemnatory 
implications of punishment. Let me take each of these issues in tum. 
Width of the .Desert Limits 
If desert is to be treated as only a "limiting" principle, as Morris 
suggests, the question that immediately comes to mind is the breadth 
19. von Hirsch, supra note 10, at 219-26. 
20. Id. at 225-26. 
21. Id. 
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of those limits. Is desert to be a significant constraint on utilitarian 
punishments, or only some kind of wide outer limit, that merely bars 
outrageous disproportion in lenience or severity? 
The tendency of theorists who speak of desert as being only a 
"limiting" principle is to adopt the latter interpretation. 22 Sentences 
are to be decided ordinarily on utilitarian grounds alone, and desert 
comes in only as a constraint against extremes: it should be little 
more than a protection against, say, inflicting very long prison 
sentences on car thieves or burglars, or giving probation to those 
convicte~ of the most violent offenses. This is the interpretation pro-
posed by the American Bar Association's Task Force on criminal 
sentencing in its 1979 report.23 I have criticized the Task Force's 
report at some length elsewhere;24 suffice to say here that this view is 
scarcely an advance over traditional positivism of two decades ago: 
the Model Penal Code already had rules against grossly dispropor-
tionate sanctions.25 
Morris, to his credit, firmly rejects the ABA Task Force's view of 
desert as a mere "side constraint" (pp. 202-04).26 This, he recognizes, 
would be inconsistent with his own basic insistence on taking desert 
seriously. Desert, he argues, must be treated as a significant restraint 
on utilitarian punishments, not merely as a rule against unlikely ex-
tremes in punishment that defy common sense and the common mo-
rality. His words are worth quoting: 
There is clearly a difference of emphasis here [between the ABA 
Task Force's view and my own] which is not unimportant. My case for 
inequality is for mercy and clemency within an ordered system of 
justly deserved punishments; it aims at avoiding the severity amount-
ing to tyranny that rigidly insists on equality and seeks to exorcise dis-
cretion and mercy from sentencing. It accepts the long tradition of 
justice as equality but seeks to moderate it by acceptance of the uncer-
tainties attending our utilitarian purposes in the distribution of punish-
ment and to allow for a slippage of inequality to achieve parsimony in 
punishment. The ABA Report seems to go further than this and, inso-
far as it does, von Hirsch's strictures seem to me well founded. [Pp. 
203-04]. 
22. See, e.g., M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE 
FuroRE 93-109 (1981). For a critique of the book, see von Hirsch, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 819 (1983). 
23. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCJATION, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND 
PROCEDURES, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1979). 
24. von Hirsch, supra note 17. 
25. The Code prescribed statutory maxima based on the felony-category of the offense, 
and also prescribed that sentences were not to be so low as to "depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 7.0l(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
For fuller discussion, see von Hirsch, Book Review, supra note 22. 
26. The term "side constraint" is used in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 23, at 
19. 
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There are a variety of claims here that we shall need to take up later: 
that Morris's modified utilitarianism has something to do with "par-
simony," "mercy" and suchlike virtues.27 But it is plain here that 
Morris wants desert to play a significant role in the structure of pen-
alties - that it should be more than merely an outer "side 
constraint." 
So far, so good. The next question, however, is how significant 
desert's role should be: how wide or narrow should the desert-based 
limits be, within which utilitarian concerns are permitted to operate? 
Fairly wide limits - say, a few months' to five years' confinement 
for the serious offense of armed robbery - would mean that utilita-
rian considerations would still play the primary role in determining 
the choice of penalty. Narrower limits- say, a range of two years to 
three for a first offense of armed robbery - would mean that desert 
would carry a greater, perhaps the primary weight in the choice of 
penalties.28 Which does Morris prefer, the narrower or the wider de-
sert limits? He does not say.29 I am not speaking here of a mathe-
matical formula. Rather, the problem is that Morris does not even 
suggest any principles that would guide one in deciding the latitude 
of the desert limits. When he refers to the use of utilitarian consider-
ations for "fine tuning" (p. 199),30 this would suggest rather narrow 
limits. Some of his examples, however, suggest otherwise31 - a 
broad scope for utilitarian concerns. Without any specification of 
the nature of the desert limits or of how those limits might be de-
rived from his theory, one does not know what one is dealing with: a 
substantially desert-oriented system, a primarily utilitarian one, or 
27. See text at notes 43-53 iefra. 
28. The nature of these limits might conceivably be affected by how broadly or narrowly 
the prohibited conduct is defined: the desert limits on punishing armed robbery, for example, 
might have to be wider the more comprehensively robbery is defined to embrace forcible tak-
ings of varying types and shadings of gravity. But supposing one were operating with offense 
definitions of a given degree of breadth or specificity, it still needs to be explained how wide or 
narrow the desert limits should be for such offenses under Morris's theory. 
29. He admits he does not specify the width of the limits. In his words: 
I am well aware that I have not defined the proper range fixed for all crimes and for 
criminals by the upper and lower limits of undeserved severity and excessive leniency 
which exaggerate or depreciate the gravity of the crime. My view is merely that such 
ranges exist, that they should be defined as punishment categories in some form such as 
that set forth by the Minnesota Sentencing Commission . . . • 
P. 205. I doubt, however, that endorsement of the Minnesota Commission's guideline format 
would really be consistent with Morris's view. The Commission's guidelines come close to 
adopting the desert parity that Morris wishes to reject: there is a recommended presumptive 
prison sentence for each cell in the Commission's sentencing grid for which imprisonment is 
prescribed, surrounded by a quite_ narrow range of permissible variation. For a fuller analysis 
of the Minnesota Guidelines, see von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 180-91, 193-207, 208-10. 
30. It is also unclear precisely how that utilitarian "fine tuning" might be accomplished, 
given the imprecision of our efforts to gauge the crime-preventive (for example, deterrent or 
incapacitative) effects of sentences. 
31. See his proposal for the treatment of the crime of purse-snatching, at pp. 194-96, where 
he would have a range of probation to six-months incarceration. 
February 1984) Equality, "Anisonomy," and Justice 1101 
something in between. As a result, Morris's formula for "limiting 
retributivism" seems less of a theory than something akin to a party 
platform: a broad formula attractive because it accommodates what 
are in fact substantially different positions. 
Is the more thoroughgoing desert model I have been advocating 
less ambiguous than Morris's scheme? Here, we must resort again to 
the cardinal/ ordinal distinction. Desert theorists, at least as yet, 
have hardly done better than Morris in specifying the precise extent 
of the limits which desert imposes on the cardinal magnitudes of 
punishment.32 But our model calls for considerably more specificity 
in dealing with ordinal magnitudes: to meet the requirements of 
parity and rank-ordering, crimes will have to be graded according to 
their seriousness; normally recommended penalties will have to be 
assigned to those gradations; and deviations from those penalties 
permitted only in special circumstances related to the harm or culpa-
bility of the offender's conduct.33 This will not, in pure theory, pro-
vide for a unique set of solutions, since (given the open-endedness of 
the cardinal requirements) the penalty scale as a whole could be in-
flated or deflated to a considerable extent while the relative propor-
tions among punishments were held constant. But in practice, such a 
theory will provide substantially more guidance to the rulemakers. 
A sentencing commission does not in fact have all that much leeway 
in inflating or deflating overall severity levels, without encountering 
limits on the availability of prison resources on the one hand and 
political constraints on reducing severities on the other.34 Where the 
commission's power resides, and where it needs guidance, is in de-
ciding questions of relative severity and in determining how much to 
emphasize the gravity of the criminal conduct versus other factors in 
deciding who is to be confined and for how.long. It is precisely on 
this issue of distribution that the desert-oriented view, with its strong 
ordinal requirements, provides definite guidance as to which defend-
ants should be punished more severely, and which less, and as to 
what aspects of the crime and the criminal's history should be relied 
upon in the guidelines. 35 And it is on that crucial issue that Morris 
leaves his model so little specified, because he downgrades the ordi-
nal desert requirements and looks only to the much less clear cardi-
nal requirements of desert. 
32. See discussion in von Hirsch, supra note IO, at 219-26. 
33. Id at 214-19, 237-44. 
34. For a discussion of these practical constraints, see id at 225. 
35. In Minnesota, for example, reliance on the ordinal requirements of desert were critical 
in helping the Commission decide questions of relative severity of punishments. See von 
Hirsch, supra note 5, at 180-91. 
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The Blaming Implications of Punishment 
The case for the ordinal requirements - that is, for equal treat-
ment of the equally undeserving and for ranking punishments ac-
cording to the seriousness of crimes - rests on the condemnatory 
implications of punishment. The reason, according to desert theo-
rists, why the ordinal proportionality requirements must be observed 
is that to do otherwise means blaming equally reprehensible conduct 
unequally, or blaming less reprehensible conduct more than worse 
conduct.36 
How does Morris deal with this issue of the reprobative over-
tones of punishment? He ignores it. To desert advocates who object 
to his model as permitting unequal punishment of the equally 
blameworthy, his answer is that such arguments are merely circular: 
"[T]hey seem to me rather to restate the conflict than to resolve it 
against my view" (p. 202). 
But the argument is not circular. It can be stated in general terms 
as follows: 
I. Suppose X is an institution having strong praising or blaming im-
plications, such that the quantum of X distributed to any recipient 
connotes how much he is to be praised or blamed for his or her 
conduct. 
2. It follows that X should as a matter of fairness be distributed 
among recipients so as to comport with the degree of praiseworthi-
ness or blameworthiness of the recipient's conduct in the relevant 
respect. 
3. Therefore if one does not wish to distribute X according to recipi-
ents' deserts, one must make one of these two moves: 
a. Deny the premise; that is, show that ins~itution X has no such 
praising or blaming implications, as customarily understood; or 
else 
b. Reform institution X so that its praising or blaming implica-
tions are eliminated or diminished so far as possible. 
Let me give a modest illustration. Each year, the School of 
Criminal Justice at Rutgers University awards a certain number of 
fellowships and assistantships to graduate students. The fellowships 
are explicitly designated as awards, and carry a stipend but no added 
work. The assistantships are not so designated, and involve working 
with a faculty member. Because of the different character of the two 
institutions, our faculty uses different criteria to distribute them. The 
fellowships, in virtue of their character as awards, are distributed 
according to desert: that is, according to the quality of the student's 
past academic performance. The assistantships, however, are dis-
tributed according to more utilitarian criteria: since they are viewed 
36. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 71-72: see also von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 784-
89. 
February 1984] Equality, "A.nisonomy," and Justice 1103 
as jobs, the student's usefulness for and experience in a faculty mem-
ber's area of research are considered, along with academic grades. 
Were a faculty member to propose distributing fellowships similarly, 
he would need to argue for changing their character to make them 
less of an award and more a form of employment. 
Applying the point to punishment, the logic runs similarly. De-
sert theorists' crucial claim is that punishment is, and ought to be, a 
blaming institution - and hence that penalties should be distributed 
according to the degree of blameworthiness of criminal conduct. In 
order to do that, one must observe the ordinal requirements of de-
sert: to punish equally blameworthy criminal conduct equally, and 
to grade severities of penalties so as to comport with the rank-order-
ing of seriousness of crimes.37 To resist these conclusions, one needs 
to deny the premise; that is, to assert that punishment either (1) is 
not, or (2) should not be essentially a blaming institution. 
Assertion (1 ), denying that punishment connotes blame, seems to 
me pretty implausible. The only perceptible difference between a tax 
and a fine, for example, resides in the condemnatory character of the 
fine; not in the material deprivation, which in both cases is a taking 
of money.38 I doubt Professor Morris would wish to deny the blam-
ing character of punishment. 
Assertion (2) is not quite so implausible: one conceivably could 
say that the blaming element of punishment is an historical relic; and 
that one should seek to reform the criminal sanction so as to make it 
only a material disincentive against undesirable conduct, with little 
or no moralizing overtones. One could argue, further, that disre-
garding ordinal-proportionality requirements would be a step to-
ward thus reforming the sanction, to be taken along with other 
symbolic changes (such as, if one wished to go far enough, even 
eliminating morally-laden terms such as "innocence" or "guilt"). 
This is not merely hypothetical: juvenile-justice reformers in the 
United States tried for years to recast the juvenile system so as to 
eliminate all traces of moral stigma. 
But I wonder if this route would have much attraction for Profes-
sor Morris. It might, in the first place, carry utilitarian costs he 
would not like: were the criminal sanction to involve only material 
deprivation and not much moral obloquy, much higher levels of ma-
terial deprivation might conceivably have to be resorted to in order 
to achieve even a minimal level of crime prevention.39 Second and 
37. See note 36 supra. 
38. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of punishment, see generally R. W ASSERSTROM, 
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 112-51 (1980). 
39. The link between condemnation and crime-prevention is discussed at greater length in 
von Hirsch, "Neoclassicism," Proportionality, and the Rationale for Punishment: 17roughts on 
the Scandinavian .Debate, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 52, 58-59 (1983). 
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more seriously, eliminating or downgrading the blame element in 
punishment might eliminate desert requirements too well. Not only 
might it dispense with the need for parity and rank-ordering in pun-
ishments, but it might also dispense with the desert requirement 
Morris does wish to keep: to wit, the cardinal-proportionality princi-
ple barring absolute disproportion in punishment. After all, the civil 
commitment law has had no similar principle, precisely because no 
moral stigma has been seen as involved in its sanctions, as Morris 
himself has noted (p. 30). No, I doubt that he is any more willing 
than 140 to excise the blaming element in punishment. But if that 
element is retained, I find it hard to understand how ordinal desert 
requirements can justly be disregarded. 
III 
In support of his sentencing conception, Morris offers some prag-
matic arguments concerning existing sentencing practice and the no-
tion of "parsimony." He also mentions the idea of mercy. Let me 
consider these issues briefly. 
Existing Sentencing Practice: Exemplary Punishments 
Judges sometimes impose extra punishment on selected offenders 
for deterrent effect. Morris cites the instance of the exemplary sen-
tence imposed on nine white hoodlums convicted of racial assaults 
on blacks in the Notting Hill district of London in 1958 (pp. 187-88). 
Such a practice, he points out, does not comport with the parity re-
quirements of desert: 
It needs no refined analysis to demonstrate that these nine offenders 
were selected for unequal treatment before the law. Please do not mis-
understand me; I am not opposing such sentences, quite the contrary. 
Rather, I am arguing that if the increased penalty is within the legisla-
tively prescribed range, then any supposed principle of equality does 
not prevent such a sentence from being in the appropriate case a just 
punishment. [P. 188, emphasis in original]. 
The difficulty with this argument should be apparent: citing the 
existence of a sentencing practice does not demonstrate the justice of 
that practice. Yes, judges, when left to their discretion, sometimes 
impose exemplary deterrent sentences; they also often impose extra 
punishments on the basis of predictions of debatable accuracy.41 
They may also engage in a variety of other practices that are not 
necessarily defensible. Such facts, however, no more establish that 
40. My own arguments for why the sanction against criminal behavior should involve 
blame are set forth in id at 63-69. 
41. See von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Co,!finement of Convicted 
Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972), reprinted in SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 148-74. 
For further bibliography, see SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 186. 
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exemplary sentences are appropriate than they show that predictive 
sentencing is desirable. Some jurisdictions, moreover, have re-
formed their sentencing systems so as to sharply restrict judges' pow-
ers to impose exemplary or predictive sentences. The Minnesota and 
Washington sentencing guidelines are examples of this.42 (Surely, 
Morris would not permit me to argue that the fact of Minnesota's or 
Washington's insistence on desert-parity is, alone, reason for con-
cluding that parity ought to be observed as a matter of justice.) 
The Parsimony Argument 
Elaborating on his earlier writings,43 Morris asserts that it is 
"parsimonious" to impose unequal punishments - that is, to ignore 
or downgrade the requirements of desert-parity. Suppose, he says, 
that a sentencing commission is deciding what is to be the normally 
applicable penalty for second-time purse-snatchers. If parity is not 
required, one can give most such purse-snatchers probation and 
achieve such deterrence as is necessary by giving a few six months in 
jail. He thus would recommend that the commission adopt a proba-
tion-to-six-months range as the standard penalty. If equally culpable 
purse-snatchers must be punished equally, however, then the com-
mission may, as a realistic matter, have to require that a// of them be 
sent to jail for a short period - a less parsimonious result in Morris's 
view (pp. 194-96). 
The most natural and straightforward response of the desert the-
orist would be to hold his ground. If blame is and should be so 
central to the idea of punishment, then it simply is unjust to impose 
unequal punishments on those found guilty of equally reprehensible 
crimes; and that inequality remains unjust even when urged in the 
name of parsimony. But Morris's argument strikes me as questiona-
ble even within his framework of "limiting retributivism." Is it re-
ally so obvious that abandoning desert-parity will produce more 
"parsimonious" results? 
Morris has made his conclusion sound plausible through his 
choice of example. People tend to be only moderately exercised 
about how purse-snatchers are punished. If we change the example 
to a substantially more fear-instilling crime, things may work 
differently. 
Consider the crime of armed robbery. In devising the penalty for 
armed robbery and other crimes, the Minnesota sentencing commis-
sion did adopt a strong parity requirement.44 This meant that when 
42. For the philosophy of the Minnesota Guidelines, see von Hirsch, supra note 5. The 
text of the Guidelines may be found at 5 HAMLINE L. REv. 395-437 (1982). The Washington 
Guidelines are set forth in WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.94A (1981). 
43. Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING, supra note 3, at 256-71. 
44. See von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 208-10. 
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limited prison resources were taken into account, terms for armed 
robbery had to be in the two-to-three year range (depending on the 
offender's criminal record), with longer terms reserved for the mi-
nority of defendants having quite long criminal records.45 Suppose 
the commission had instead rejected parity. This could have meant 
that some armed robbers (say, those deemed favorable risks) would 
get shorter terms than Minnesota's two-to-three years. But it would 
also have meant that other robbers would get longer terms, and a 
few could be visited with extremely long terms. To prevent excessive 
severity, Morris might apply his retributive ceiling by, for example, 
limiting the prison terms of robbers (other than those with the worst 
records) to no more than, say, five years. But if we are speaking of a 
commission's realistic choices, as Morris claims he is (pp. 192-93), 
how easy would it be to defend such a limit? Once a commission 
abandons parity in the treatment of robbery, how e.ff ectively can it 
defend a maximum of five years when it is practically feasible to 
imprison some robbers for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, and when 
that may appear to be the more effective exemplary deterrent? The 
more one downgrades parity and permits selectivity among those 
convicted of a crime of a given degree of gravity, the harder it will be 
in practice to prevent the extraordinarily severe treatment of a se-
lected few. As the crime becomes more serious and demands for a 
tough response increase, this problem will become all the worse. 
The problem of harsher punishment for the unlucky few raises 
the question of parsimony for whom? Suppose the penalty for Crime 
A has been set atx years confinement and that there are 100 defend-
ants per year convicted of the crime. Suppose that, by abandoning 
the parity requirement, one will reduce the penalty for fifty defend-
ants by one-half; keep the penalty the same for another twenty-five; 
and double the penalty for the remaining twenty-five. Has one pro-
duced a more parsimonious result? That depends on how one de-
fines parsimony. If one counts only the number of defendants, a 
larger number get lower punishment than before. Were one to use 
the more sophisticated utilitarian criterion of aggregate cost - by 
factoring in the amount of penalty-change per person as well as the 
number of persons involved - there would be no change in net se-
verity. Were one to adopt the nonutilitarian criterion of considering 
the position of potentially the worst-off persons46 - a criterion that 
Morris has not hesitated to use in other contexts47 - then the change 
does not seem parsimonious at all: instead of facing a punishment of 
x years, the potentially disadvantaged defendant faces double that 
amount. And his extra suffering - as a separate person with only 
45. See id at 176, 192-93. 
46. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
47. See N. MORRIS, supra note l, at 80-84. 
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his own life to lead - is scarcely made good by the benefit accruing 
to other defendants. 
One could continue arguing the parsimony issue, but my last 
point can be stated more generally as follows. If one is debating the 
relative merits of a more versus a less utilitarian conception of pun-
ishment, any claim about parsimony can carry persuasive weight 
only if it does not beg the question by adopting utilitarian assump-
tions itself. The ABA Task Force Report, in one passage, flagrantly 
ignored this point by explicitly defining parsimony in crime-control 
terms.48 Morris is careful to avoid that obvious pitfall (p. 157), but 
his arguments about parsimony still seem to come dangerously close 
to assuming the utilitarian notions he is setting out to prove. 
The Mercy Argument 
Throughout his book, Morris keeps asserting that his scheme is 
more "merciful" than a more thoroughgoing desert approach.49 The 
claim is not easily responded to, because penologists (including my-
self) have hardly touched upon the concept of mercy. 
In the philosophical literature, however, there has been some dis-
cussion. One useful analysis is entitled "On Mercy," written a dec-
ade ago by Claudia Card.so Mercy, Dr. Card suggests, is not a 
utilitarian concept at all. If a judge reduces an offender's penalty 
below the norm for that offense because he or she finds the offender 
is not dangerous or would better respond to correctional treatment in 
the community, or because the offender is a noted scientist who 
needs to be at liberty in order to discover a new cancer cure, these 
are prudential reasons for being more lenient but not for acts of 
mercy in the commonly understood sense. Mercy, Card contends, is 
a conception that is tied to the idea of desert. It involves reducing 
the penalty on grounds that go beyond the normal reasons of dimin-
ished culpability, but nevertheless are concerned with the suitability 
and commensurability of punishment for someone who has been vis-
ited by much collateral suffering.s1 
If Card is right - and I think she is at least on the right track -
then desert advocates should think more seriously than they have 
about the issue of mercy. Perhaps there exist a variety of circum-
stances where one should be permitted to go below the normally ap-
plicable penalty on grounds related to mercy. A beginning would be 
to consider the appropriateness of reducing the punishment in cases 
where the act has visited the offender himself with sufficiently injuri-
48. See von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 776-79. 
49. See, e.g., pp. 203, 206. 
50. Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REv. 182 (1972). 
51. Id at 184-87, 201. 
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ous consequences. (The German Penal Code, in the context of a law 
with considerable retributivist traditions, 52 has an analogous 
provision. 53) 
I find it difficult to understand, however, how the idea of mercy 
fits into Morris's scheme. If it is an act of prudence rather than 
mercy to fix penalties for utilitarian ends, then how has Morris made 
his system more merciful by limiting the scope of desert considera-
tions and expanding the scope of utilitarian ones in deciding the ap-
propriate sentence? Morris has not explained what he means by 
mercy, or how mercy is to· be distinguished from other concepts that 
he uses (such as parsimony). Without such an explanation, his talk of 
mercy strikes me as more rhetorical than illuminating. 
IV 
While gallons· (nay, barrels) of ink have been spent on the in-
sanity defense, the issue of the half-mad has scarcely been touched. 
Professor Morris, to his great credit, opens the issue to debate.54 
However one chooses to define legal insanity, there will be a good 
number of defendants who do not satisfy the test of exculpation; who 
will thus have to be sentenced; and yet who were suffering from 
some degree of mental disturbance when they committed the act. 
Such cases of partial disability are apt to be much more frequently 
encountered than the very small number of insanity acquittals. 
What should be done with such persons? Morris's proposal is, essen-
tially, to scale down the punishment for such offenders on grounds of 
their reduced culpability. In his words, "[p]unishment will be re-
duced by reason of mental illness to the degree to which those im-
posing that punishment regard the offender's moral culpability as 
lessened by his mental illness" (p. 152). I thoroughly agree that this 
is the proper conclusion, but question its consistency with Morris's 
general sentencing theory. Let me explain why. 
1. It is true that partial mental disability reduces a person's cul-
pability. The person is less to blame because his mental troubles 
reduce his capacity to exercise judgment and self-control. For that 
reason, the half-mad defendant, even if he does not satisfy the test 
for legal insanity, deserves less punishment. 
2. On a desert-oriented rationale for sentencing, there is no con-
ceptual difficulty in accommodating the half-mad. Desert theory 
(notwithstanding Morris's occasional assertions to the contrary) 
does not require mechanical equality in punishment for all convicted 
52. Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 Mo. L. REV. 37, 39 (1983). 
53. STGB 60. This calls for remission of the entire punishment when the adverse conse-
quences of the act to the actor are sufficiently great. 
54. His discussion of sentencing the half-mad is set forth in chapter 4 of the book, pp. 129-
76. 
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of a given offense. The parity requirements of desert calls for equal 
treatment of equally blameworthy defendants55 and diminished cul-
pability means less blameworthiness. This is not a matter of mercy 
either, as Morris asserts (pp. 155-59); the less culpable defendant 
deserves and is entitled to reduced punishment. In desert-based 
guideline systems, this can be achieved through the presumptive sen-
tence device: while a set quantum of punishment is assigned to each 
gradation of severity, the judge retains authority to deviate below 
that sentence for mitigating circumstances related to desert.56 One 
such ground for mitigation is partial mental disability. The Minne-
sota guidelines (which Morris himself quotes on this point (p. 173)), 
include the following in the list of mitigating factors warranting de-
partures below the prescribed grid ranges: "The offender, because of 
physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judg-
ment when the offense was committed."57 
3. On Morris's "limiting :i;etributivism" rationale,58 however, it is 
difficult to explain why punishments should be reduced for the half-
mad. If desert sets only the upper and lower boundaries of permissi-
ble punishment, and if the sentence is to be fixed within those 
bounds on utilitarian grounds,59 what room is there for considering 
the reduced culpability of the partially mentally disabled? Whether 
someone gets a sentence near the top or the bottom of the prescribed 
penalty range would, on this theory, depend only on utilitarian fac-
tors of incapacitation or deterrence (pp. 196-202). The fact that the 
half-mad defendant is less culpable would be irrelevant, since desert 
would set only the boundaries of the range, and we are speaking of a 
punishment within the range to be decided on crime-preventive 
grounds. The half-mad defendant would get a sentence in the lower 
portion of the range only if he was a good risk, and was not conspic-
uous enough to be used as an example to others; and he would get no 
less a punishment than a wholly sane defendant who was equally 
nondangerous and equally inconspicuous. 
4. How, then, does Morris explain his treatment of the half-mad? 
His suggestion is that the partially disabled defendant should, in 
view of his reduced culpability, receive a sentence in the lower por-
tion of the range - unless there is a strong basis (in the sense of a 
55. von Hirsch, wpra note 10, at 244-45. 
56. A. VON HIRSCH, wpra note 4, at 98-101. 
57. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY§ 11.D.2.a.(3) (1981). The mitigating and aggravating factors 
listed in Minnesota's guidelines are primarily desert-re1ated. See, von Hirsch, wpra note 5, at 
205-07. 
58. I am speaking here of the general sentencing theory that Morris sets forth in Chapter 5 
of his present book and in his earlier book The Future <if Imprisonment, N. MORRIS, wpra note 
1, and which was discussed in Parts 1-111 of this review. 
59. See text at notes 8-9 wpra. 
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high base-expectancy rate) for believing that he is a poor risk (pp. 
146-72). The suggestion is interesting, surely, but hard to square 
with his general theory. As just explained, the theory calls for desert 
considerations to set only the boundaries of the ranges. And the the-
ory does not ordinarily require such strong evidence of utilitarian 
effects when locating the sentence within the range: Morris, for in-
stance, is quite unembarrassed to accept exemplary deterrence on 
much flimsier evidence (pp. 187-88). 
What Morris's proposals on the half-mad imply, then, is a differ-
ent general theory of punishment. His suggested treatment of the 
half-mad would be consistent with a sentencing theory having the 
following features: (1) desert would set the upper and lower limits 
of the range. (2) within those limits, desert would have another crit-
ical role: the punishment would vary (in an approximate, nonquan-
titative fashion) with the offender's degree of culpability. (3) the 
punishment may be increased within the range on utilitarian 
grounds only when there are strong empirical grounds for expecting 
significant preventive effects. The reduced punishment to which 
half-mad defendants would normally be entitled would then be ex-
plainable in terms of their reduced culpability - since degree of 
blameworthiness would ordinarily be decisive in deciding the sen-
tence within the range. The insistence on a high base rate expec-
tancy before increasing the sentence on predictive grounds would 
also become explicable because of the stricter standard this theory 
imposes for using preventive considerations. (I do not know whether 
Morris accepts this embryo of a theory - a subsequent lecture by 
him suggests not.60). What is apparent, however, is that this is a very 
different conception than a limiting retributivism that relegates de-
sert to defining the range boundaries; and that this theory, by mak-
ing culpability so important for decisions within the range and by 
restricting the use of utilitarian considerations, would give consider-
ably more weight to the concept of desert. 
V 
Let us tum, finally, to the fully mad and to Professor Morris's 
views on the insanity defense. His position is simply stated. A de-
fendant's insanity should be considered, like any other relevant evi-
dence, in determining whether he had the requisite degree of mens 
rea - for example, in determining whether he had the intent to 
commit the act that the law requires in most felonies (pp. 53-76). 
60. "On 'Dangerousness in the Judicial Process,'" lecture by Norval Morris, New York 
University Law School (Oct. 18, 1983). In this lecture, Morris broadly endorses use of predic-
tion in sentencing, subject only to validation of the prediction instrument and to upper and 
lower bounds of desert. For a critique of his views in that lecture, see von Hirsch, The Ethics of 
Selective Incapacitation, 30 Crime & Delinq. - (1984) (forthcoming). 
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However, there should be no separate insanity defense. In the 
course of developing this abolitionist position, Morris provides a val-
uable overview of the current debate over the insanity defense, and 
furnishes telling criticisms of sillier recent schemes, such as the 
"guilty but insane" plea (pp. 83-87). 
Should the insanity defense be abolished? Morris rightly re-
minds us that the debate is not about the principle that punishment 
should presuppose blameworthiness. Abolitionists support this prin-
ciple as do preservationists - they argue only over whether it can 
adequately be taken into account through the law's mens rea require-
ments. In Morris's words: 
One is left, therefore, with the feeling that the special defense [of in-
sanity] is a genuflection to a deep-seated moral sense that the mentally 
ill lack freedom of choice to guide and govern their conduct and that 
therefore blame should not be imputed to them for their otherwise 
criminal acts nor should punishment be imposed. [However] ... it is 
important not to assume that those who advocate the abolition of the 
special defense of insanity are recommending the wholesale punish-
ment of the sick. They are urging rather that mental illness be given 
the same exculpatory effect as other adversities that bear upon criminal 
guilt. [P. 59]. 
What the abolition debate is about, however, is the criteria for 
judging the blameworthiness of the mentally ill. To support aboli-
tion is to say that the idea of criminal intent61 suffices to express the 
notion of the blameworthiness that should be required of any de-
fendant, even a mentally troubled one. To support retention is to 
say that, where mad defendants are concerned, having an intent to 
commit the act should not be a sufficient condition for culpability; 
the defendant's capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his act, 
or his capacity for controlling his actions, also matter.62 
Who is right? An answer would require deeper exploration of 
our conceptions of personal fault.63 Is the defendant who acts with 
apparent purpose but for wholly crazy reasons properly to be held 
accountable? Can one make sense of the idea of someone being in-
capable of exercising self-control, as opposed simply to his failure to 
61. Morris notes that abolition of the special defense of insanity would inculpate mad de-
fendants charged with crimes of negligence, since the applicable definitions of criminal negli-
gence do not presuppose personal fault. But if this seems unfair, he suggests, the reason lies in 
the inadequacy of those definitions of criminal liability: punishing without requiring personal 
fault is unfair not merely to the mentally disturbed defendant but to any defendant. Pp. 70-72. 
Morris's solution would be to eliminate negligence liability in.the criminal law altogether. Pp. 
70-72. Mine would be to retain it but require that the defendant was capable of compre-
hending the risk in the circumstances even if he did not in fact consider the risk. 
62. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
63. A valuable exploration of these issues is found in Professor Richard G. Singer's recent 
review essay on Morris's book. Singer, Abolition of the Insanity JJefanse: Madness and the 
Criminal Law (Book Review), 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 683 (1983). 
1112 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 82:1093 
exercise it? Despite all the debate over insanity these conceptual is-
sues remain to be illuminated adequately. 
Morris, unfortunately, does not explore such questions. He con-
tents him.self with stating his preference for abolition in general 
terms; with emphasizing that the insanity defense is not important as 
a practical matter (because it is almost never used for defendants 
charged with everyday felonies); and with asserting that the culpabil-
ity of mentally disturbed defendants is a matter of degree (pp. 61-
62). In an otherwise thoroughly philosophical book, Morris never 
really reaches the issue of principle: of deciding what it is - the 
presence of or absence of intent, the reasons for an act, or whatever 
- that might render an insane defendant free from fault. As a re-
sult, I do not think he has made a convincing case for abolition of 
the insanity defense. 
It should be emphasized, however, that Morris's main thoughts 
about sentencing do not dep,end on his conclusions about the in-
sanity defense. The abolitionist, just as much as the preservationist, 
is free to prefer either a more or less utilitarian conception of how 
much to punish those whom the law decides are suitable candidates 
for punishment. 
VI 
I have described Morris's book as argumentative in the best 
sense, and have herein been rather argumentative myself. Our 
points of disagreement should not, however, obscure the important 
points of agreement that I mentioned earlier: on the need to take 
desert serious(Y as a principle of punishment; and on the need to face 
honestly the tension between retributive and utilitarian concerns in 
sentencing. Nor should they obscure the sense I have of the merit of 
this ]?ook: it is among the most stimulating works on criminal juris-
prudence to have appeared in years. 
